Game Theory playing out

fmftint

The problem as I see it is in the rankings. There should not be a PVP element in PVE. Progression rewards max out too soon, everyone should be able to earn all rewards in PVE not whoever gets the most points the fastest.
Put a first Thor cover at X points, a second at Y, a third at Z, make it ridiculously high but attainable

Unknown

Unknown

gamar wrote:

Eddiemon wrote:

gamar wrote:

The Prisoner's dilemma supposes there's a HIGHER reward for collaborating, while here the best strategy to the the highest award actually is to outperform, and the prisoner's dilemma rests on the fact that you (individually) are always better off betraying EVEN IF your partner IS trustworthy

If none of us sleep then you will end up in position X and I will end up in position Y.
If we all sleep 8 hours then you will end up in position X and I will end up in position Y. Nobody gets any extra points while we are all asleep. But we have all had 8 hours sleep which is the reward for collaborating.
If I sleep and you don't then you end up in position X++ and I end up in position Y--.
If you sleep and I don't then you end up in position X-- and I end up in position Y++.

That's the quintessential prisoners dilemma outcome matrix. Big rewards for betraying a trustworthy partner. Worst case for everyone if we all betray. Best outcome for everyone is to all co-operate.

You see the rewards as just the covers. Sleep is its own reward, and I can't recommend it enough. And having sleep without losing my event position - priceless.

No, because if I betray you, my reward is "position X++" and if we all cooperate, it's lower - only "position X and sleep." (We can assume the "++" in position is more valuable to me than sleep since otherwise I would have no reason to betray.) So, since "we all cooperate" doesn't give me my best-case outcome, it's not a prisoners dilemma matrix.

Regardless, Coase Theorem says you cannot effectively collude in this situation.

Eddiemon

gamar wrote:

No, because if I betray you, my reward is "position X++" and if we all cooperate, it's lower - only "position X and sleep." (We can assume the "++" in position is more valuable to me than sleep since otherwise I would have no reason to betray.) So, since "we all cooperate" doesn't give me my best-case outcome, it's not a prisoners dilemma matrix.

I don't think you understand the prisoner's dilemma at all.

It is a dilemma because the best individual outcome is to betray but the best outcome for the group is to co-operate. The best individual outcome is not to co-operate, otherwise why would anyone bother betraying?

In a classic prisoners dilemma if we both co-operate we each spend a year in jail (second best outcome for you, best outcome for the group). If we both defect then we spend 2 years in jail each (Middle outcome for you, worst outcome for the group). If one of us co-operates and the other defects the defector gets off and the co-operator gets 3 years in jail. (Best outcome for the betrayer, worst outcome for the betrayed, middle outcome for the group)

In this case if we co-operate we maintain out positions and get sleep (second best outcome for you, best outcome for the group). If we both defect then we maintain our positions but go insane from lack of sleep (Middle outcome for you, worst outcome for the group). If one of us co-operates and the other defects then the defector gets a much better ranking and the co-operator gets a much worse ranking. (best outcome for the betrayer, worst outcome for the betrayed, middle outcome for the group).

Unknown

Eddiemon wrote:

gamar wrote:

No, because if I betray you, my reward is "position X++" and if we all cooperate, it's lower - only "position X and sleep." (We can assume the "++" in position is more valuable to me than sleep since otherwise I would have no reason to betray.) So, since "we all cooperate" doesn't give me my best-case outcome, it's not a prisoners dilemma matrix.

I don't think you understand the prisoner's dilemma at all.

It is a dilemma because the best individual outcome is to betray but the best outcome for the group is to co-operate. The best individual outcome is not to co-operate, otherwise why would anyone bother betraying?

In a classic prisoners dilemma if we both co-operate we each spend a year in jail (second best outcome for you, best outcome for the group). If we both defect then we spend 2 years in jail each (Middle outcome for you, worst outcome for the group). If one of us co-operates and the other defects the defector gets off and the co-operator gets 3 years in jail. (Best outcome for the betrayer, worst outcome for the betrayed, middle outcome for the group)

In this case if we co-operate we maintain out positions and get sleep (second best outcome for you, best outcome for the group). If we both defect then we maintain our positions but go insane from lack of sleep (Middle outcome for you, worst outcome for the group). If one of us co-operates and the other defects then the defector gets a much better ranking and the co-operator gets a much worse ranking. (best outcome for the betrayer, worst outcome for the betrayed, middle outcome for the group).

The reason this doesn't really work as a classic prisoner's dilemma scenario is because A and B are immediately aware of each other's decisions and the incentive is actually NOT to betray. In the classic example, A doesn't know if B will betray so A's incentive is to betray in case B betrays and he gets the worst outcome or B doesn't betray and he gets the best. However, if A and B were aware of each others' decision, their incentive is not to betray because they know the other will then also immediately betray to put them both worse off but still avoiding the worst. In PvE terms, if A and B agreed to clear every 8 hours, A knows that if he starts clearing every two, B will see and also clear every two thus negating his advantage from clearing every 2 and putting them on the path of sleep deprivation. Vice versa with B. Thus, they both get to sleep.

However, the real reason this isn't feasible is because you'd have to get in contact with your entire bracket and agree to a set ranking, i.e. insurmountable transaction costs as I mentioned above.

On the other hand, I do know two competitive PvPers who are friends and were in bracket together. They agreed on who'd get first and to not score above a certain point level to save HP, and they carried it out as planned.

Eddiemon

seasong wrote:

The reason this doesn't really work as a classic prisoner's dilemma scenario is because A and B are immediately aware of each other's decisions and the incentive is actually NOT to betray. In the classic example, A doesn't know if B will betray so A's incentive is to betray in case B betrays and he gets the worst outcome or B doesn't betray and he gets the best. However, if A and B were aware of each others' decision, their incentive is not to betray because they know the other will then also immediately betray to put them both worse off but still avoiding the worst. In PvE terms, if A and B agreed to clear every 8 hours, A knows that if he starts clearing every two, B will see and also clear every two thus negating his advantage from clearing every 2 and putting them on the path of sleep deprivation. Vice versa with B. Thus, they both get to sleep.

I think you missed the 'sleep' part in your calculation.

If 'A' goes to sleep for 8 hours then they won't be aware of 'B's betrayal until they wake up, at which point they have already been ****. If 'A' stays awake to watch for betrayal then they lose the sleep reward.

Unknown

Eddiemon wrote:

seasong wrote:

The reason this doesn't really work as a classic prisoner's dilemma scenario is because A and B are immediately aware of each other's decisions and the incentive is actually NOT to betray. In the classic example, A doesn't know if B will betray so A's incentive is to betray in case B betrays and he gets the worst outcome or B doesn't betray and he gets the best. However, if A and B were aware of each others' decision, their incentive is not to betray because they know the other will then also immediately betray to put them both worse off but still avoiding the worst. In PvE terms, if A and B agreed to clear every 8 hours, A knows that if he starts clearing every two, B will see and also clear every two thus negating his advantage from clearing every 2 and putting them on the path of sleep deprivation. Vice versa with B. Thus, they both get to sleep.

I think you missed the 'sleep' part in your calculation.

If 'A' goes to sleep for 8 hours then they won't be aware of 'B's betrayal until they wake up, at which point they have already been ****. If 'A' stays awake to watch for betrayal then they lose the sleep reward.

If A stayed awake to watch the betrayal he might as well betray B while he's watching for the betrayal. He literally has nothing to lose since he already skipped sleep to be watching for the betrayal in the first place.

Unknown

Man in Black: All right. Where is the poison? The battle of wits has begun. It ends when you decide and we both drink, and find out who is right... and who is dead.
Vizzini: But it's so simple. All I have to do is divine from what I know of you: are you the sort of man who would put the poison into his own goblet or his enemy's? Now, a clever man would put the poison into his own goblet, because he would know that only a great fool would reach for what he was given. I am not a great fool, so I can clearly not choose the wine in front of you. But you must have known I was not a great fool, you would have counted on it, so I can clearly not choose the wine in front of me.
Man in Black: You've made your decision then?
Vizzini: Not remotely. Because iocane comes from Australia, as everyone knows, and Australia is entirely peopled with criminals, and criminals are used to having people not trust them, as you are not trusted by me, so I can clearly not choose the wine in front of you.
Man in Black: Truly, you have a dizzying intellect.
Vizzini: Wait till I get going! Now, where was I?
Man in Black: Australia.
Vizzini: Yes, Australia. And you must have suspected I would have known the powder's origin, so I can clearly not choose the wine in front of me.
Man in Black: You're just stalling now.
Vizzini: You'd like to think that, wouldn't you? You've beaten my giant, which means you're exceptionally strong, so you could've put the poison in your own goblet, trusting on your strength to save you, so I can clearly not choose the wine in front of you. But, you've also bested my Spaniard, which means you must have studied, and in studying you must have learned that man is mortal, so you would have put the poison as far from yourself as possible, so I can clearly not choose the wine in front of me.
Man in Black: You're trying to trick me into giving away something. It won't work.
Vizzini: IT HAS WORKED! YOU'VE GIVEN EVERYTHING AWAY! I KNOW WHERE THE POISON IS!
Man in Black: Then make your choice.
Vizzini: I will, and I choose - What in the world can that be?
Man in Black: [Vizzini gestures up and away from the table. Roberts looks. Vizzini swaps the goblets]
Man in Black: What? Where? I don't see anything.
Vizzini: Well, I- I could have sworn I saw something. No matter. First, let's drink. Me from my glass, and you from yours.
Man in Black, Vizzini: [Vizzini and the Man in Black drink]
Man in Black: You guessed wrong.
Vizzini: You only think I guessed wrong! That's what's so funny! I switched glasses when your back was turned! Ha ha! You fool! You fell victim to one of the classic blunders - The most famous of which is "never get involved in a land war in Asia" - but only slightly less well-known is this: "Never go in against a Sicilian when death is on the line"! Ha ha ha ha ha ha ha! Ha ha ha ha ha ha ha! Ha ha ha...
Vizzini: [Vizzini stops suddenly, his smile frozen on his face and falls to the ground dead]
Buttercup: And to think, all that time it was your cup that was poisoned.
Man in Black: They were both poisoned. I spent the last few years building up an immunity to iocane powder.

Unknown

Eddiemon wrote:

seasong wrote:

The reason this doesn't really work as a classic prisoner's dilemma scenario is because A and B are immediately aware of each other's decisions and the incentive is actually NOT to betray. In the classic example, A doesn't know if B will betray so A's incentive is to betray in case B betrays and he gets the worst outcome or B doesn't betray and he gets the best. However, if A and B were aware of each others' decision, their incentive is not to betray because they know the other will then also immediately betray to put them both worse off but still avoiding the worst. In PvE terms, if A and B agreed to clear every 8 hours, A knows that if he starts clearing every two, B will see and also clear every two thus negating his advantage from clearing every 2 and putting them on the path of sleep deprivation. Vice versa with B. Thus, they both get to sleep.

I think you missed the 'sleep' part in your calculation.

If 'A' goes to sleep for 8 hours then they won't be aware of 'B's betrayal until they wake up, at which point they have already been ****. If 'A' stays awake to watch for betrayal then they lose the sleep reward.

In that case, B knows A would have also stayed awake watching for his betrayal so he doesn't betray. Vice versa for A. Both working out this logic, they can then both go to sleep. Or whatever.

Of course we can make increasingly complicated scenarios about why they would or wouldn't betray, but the whole point of the prisoner's dilemma is not that humans beings want to betray each other to their detriment but that if A and B can collude, they would to their betterment but since they can't, they pick an option that's worse for them both. Here, players can collude; they just chose not to.

I mean there's nothing wrong with using economic theory to model gamer behaviour, I was an Econ major myself, but this really isn't a prisoner's dilemma scenario. Of course it's also pretty cheap of me to go the Coase theorem route because Coase theorem explains everything.